




Richard T. Rogers and Lisa M. Petraglia
Support for the cooperative yardstick hypothesis was found using a standard
structure-performance model that was extended to include a cooperative market
sharevariableandwas estimatedwith a large cross-sectionoffood manufacturing
markets. Market concentration and advertising intensity were positively related
to price-costmargins. In addition, the aggregate marketshareofthe one hundred
largest agricultural marketing cooperatives was inversely related to price-cost
margins.Themagnitudeoftheeffectwaslargestinthemoreconcentratedmarkets.
This suggests that. where cooperatives have vertically extended themselves into
food processing. more competitive outcomes are found even in highly concen-
trated markets.
The structure ofthe vast majority ofmarkets within the domestic farm
sector, ignoring government programs, has historically fit the definition
ofa competitiveindustry-a large number ofatomistic firms producing a
homogeneous good. each facing a perfectly elastic demand function with
noimposingbarrierstoentryorexit. Incontrast, thefood marketingsector
began a structural transformation dUring the late 1800s, from one that
served demand for predominately unprocessed foods, toward a more con-
centrated one handlingincreasingamounts ofprocessed food. Currently,
unprocessed foods comprise only 10% ofwholesale and retail sales. while
processed foods accountfor 75%, and non-food groceryitemsthe remain-
ing 15% (Marion 1986).
Thegrowthinimportanceofverylarge. capitalintensive. diversifiedfood
manufactUringfirms resulted from the need to achieve economies ofscale
in mass production. distribution, and control over new food processing
technologies (Marion 1986). Giventhe perishabilityand bulkiness ofmost
farm products, individual farmers face a marketing environment where
buyers of raw agricultural output have significant power. In addition,
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processors often possess market power in the output markets. Such a
structural settingleaves both farmers and consumers subject to possible
abuses ofmarket power.
Thefoodandtobaccoprocessingsectorhasbeendominatedbyitslargest
firms dUring most of this century, but the degree of domination by the
very largest firms has accelerated dUring the last fifteen years. While the
Census ofManufactures counts over fifteen thousand food and tobacco
processing firms, the one hundred largest have accounted for the bulk of
the sector's economic activity. and their dominance has increased over
time. By 1988. the one hundred largest accounted for nearly 70% ofthe
sector'svalue-added (RogersandMarion 1990). Evenamongtheonehun-
dred largest, the largestofthe large accounted for this increased domina-
tion.
The increase in aggregate concentration is related to both increased
diversification of the largest firms and increased market concentration.
Theincreasedmarketconcentrationleavesfarmerssellingtofewerproces-
sors and consumers buyingfrom firms that have sufficient market power
to raise prices over costs. Farmers have long felt they faced a spatial
monopsony or oligopsonywhen selling their agricultural output, and the
cooperative movementwas an attempt to address this power imbalance.
More than any other legislation. it was the Capper-Volstead Act that
sought to improve farmers' economic welfare without injuringconsumers
in the process. Agricultural economists provided theoretical models that
showed cooperatives could improve both the financial lot of farmers as
wellasthatofconsumersbyenteringstagesofthefood systemresponsible
formarketpowerabuses.Thistheoreticalfoundationhaslargelyprevailed.
although challenges began to emerge that questioned whether coopera-
tives could gain and abuse market power.
Market Power and Cooperatives
Debate continues overwhetherthe limited antitrust exemption enjoyed
by cooperatives can lead to excessive use ofmarket power. Certainly
agricultural cooperatives have grown into large organizations with some
holding important market positions. Along with such growth have come
periodic challengesto favorable public policygranted cooperatives. In the
late 1970s,the NationalCommissionforthe Review ofAntitrust Laws and
Procedures concluded "The threat of monopoly by some cooperatives is
nowsubstantial" (Rogers and Marion 1990). In 1988, Daniel Oliver. then-
chairman ofthe FederalTrade Commission, claimed ''There was no good
reason to continue the antitrust exemption for agricultural cooperatives"
(Rogers and Marion 1990). Even today the press is oftensuspicious ofthe
large agricultural cooperatives that dominate some industries with the
Wall StreetJournal (March 18. 1993. p. A2) referring to Sunkist Growers,
Inc.. as "the OPEC ofthecitrus industry"and notingthat ifitwere broken
up "the U.S. consumer may eventually benefit."
Concern overcooperatives' possible excessivemarketpower to enhance
pricesandthuscompromisemarketperformancehasbeena centralfactor
in a number of antitrust investigations. Torgerson (1978). in assessing
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prises, have to recognize the risks associated with possessing market
power and, more importantly, with howthe public fears itmightbe used.
The important question is whether there is a difference between market
powerheldbya cooperativeandthatheldbyaninvestor-ownedfirm (IOF).
Cooperativeshave notkeptpacewiththeincreasedsizeanddomination
bythe largestfood and tobacco manufacturers.Theincreaseddomination
by the one-hundred largest firms is almost exclusively the result of the
mergeractivityoftheleadingtwentyfood and tobaccofirms, none ofwhich
is an agricultural cooperative. By 1988 the top twenty food and tobacco
firms controlled 40% of the sector's value-added. This was up sharply
from the 1967 level and contrasts to a steady share ofvalue-added held
by the firms ranked from twenty-one to one hundred largest (Rogers and
Marion 1990). Rogers and Marion found that there were no agricultural
cooperatives among the fifty largest food and tobacco processors in 1982
measured byvalue-added. Since cooperatives are oftenmore prevalent in
commodity-oriented markets, theyranked higherwhen sales, ratherthan
value-added was the size measure. But no cooperatives were among the
twenty largest food processors in 1982based on food sales, and onlyfour
ranked in the twenty-one to fifty largestgroup (Rogers and Marion 1990).
Nevertheless, agricultural cooperatives have a significant presence in
food processing. In 1982, sixty-eight ofthe one hundred largest agricul-
tural cooperatives were involved in food processing and accounted for
7.2% ofthe sector's value ofshipments (Rogers and Marion 1990). Their
combinedshare ofshipmentswashigherinthe more commodity-oriented
productsthatinvolvedminimalprocessingandusedlargevolumesoftheir
members' output. For example, in this study, the one hundred largest
cooperatives held 64% of the manufactured butter industry yet none of
the highly differentiated breakfast cereal industry.
Market Performance and the 10 Model
The central question here is whether market performance is improved,
hindered, or unaffected when agricultural cooperatives hold a significant
position in a processed food market. Cooperative theory developed from
the early work of Nourse (1922), then by the more formal modeling of
HeImbergerandHoos (1962), andextendedbyresearcherssuchas Cotter-
ill (1987), predicts improved performance in markets where cooperatives
are present through the competitive yardstick effect. In short, when an
open membership agricultural cooperative vertically integrates into an
imperfectly competitive market, the theory predicts the market outcomes
movetoward those associatedwithperfectcompetition.Wheneverpositive
profits exist in the processing market, either due to short-run disequilib-
riumor, moreimportantly, frommarketpower, anopenmembershipcoop-
erative will benefit both farmers selling to the processor and consumers
buying from the processor. The interest here is to test the theoretical
expectation in the processor's outputmarket by determining ifthe degree
ofcooperative participation in processed food markets is associated with
improved market performance.
Industrial organization (10) theory provides a basic model to explain
market performance. In the basic paradigm, market conditions combine4 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
with elements ofmarket structure and firm conduct to determine market
performance. Market performance is a multidimensional concept that
ranges from technical and allocative efficiency to questions regarding the
distribution ofwealth. In this studywe restrict our interest to a measure
that emphasizes efficiency-the market's price-cost margin (PCM), often
called the Lerner index of market power. In addition. we feature market
structure in determining a market's PCM and estimate a standard cross-
sectional model linkingmarket structureand performance, modified only
by including a newvariable to test the cooperative yardstick hypothesis.
Theothervariablesarethetraditionalmarketstructurefactors substanti-
ated in the industrial organization literature through thirty-five years of
theoretical and empirical research.
No attempt was made to challenge the basic industrial organization
model that has generated numerous empirical studies linking market
structure to market performance. That literature is enormous and has
been the subject ofseveral major review articles. (For a general review of
the literature see Schmalensee 1989. and Scherer and Ross 1990; and
for an overview specific to food manufactUring see Connor et al. 1985.)
Although such cross-sectionalstudieshave fallen outoffavor, Schmalen-
see(1989) arguesthatsuchstudiesdeserveattentionandneedreplication
but should remain modest in their claims. As he states. "Cross-sectional
studies rarely ifever yield consistent estimates ofstructural parameters,
but they can produce useful stylized facts to guide theory construction
and analysis ofparticular industries" (p. 952). It is in that vein that we
amend a standard. structure-performance model to include a measure of
cooperative participation to shed light on the market performance effect
agricultural cooperativeshave in a large cross-sectionoffood and tobacco
manufactUring markets.
Data for the 1982 Price-Cost Margin Study
The critical data to test whether cooperatives improve market perfor-
mance in food processing reqUired both traditional Census of Manufac-
tures data for 1982 and a special tabulation ofthe Census. Considerable
carewasusedtoalignCensusindustryandproductclassdatawithmean-
ingfuleconomicmarkets. Generally.theCensusfive-digitStandardIndus-
trial Classification (SIC) product class best approximates a relevant eco-
nomicmarket. Wheneverthiswasnotthecase. eitherthefour-digitindus-
trydatawereusedorCensuswasaskedtoprovidedatathatbetterreflected
an economic market. Four-digit data were preferred twice (e.g.. the four-
digit beer industry was used rather than its five-digit product classes:
bottled beer. canned beer. and so on) and Census constructed twelve
special observationsbycombiningeither two related. four-digit SICs (e.g..
the beetand canesugarindustries were combined) orfive-digit SICs (e.g.,
broilerscombined SIC 20161 and 20171). In 1982, the Censushad a total
of161 five-digit SICs infood (SIC 20) and tobacco (SIC 21) manufactUring.
and after the above substitutions were made. along with a deletion of a
few observations that still failed to approximatean economic market (e.g..
SIC 20999. miscellaneous food and kindred products), wehad 134mean-
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vations represented 90% of the total value-of-shipments (VaS) in food
and tobacco manufacturingindustries (see Petragliaand Rogers 1991 for
complete details and a listing ofthe data set).
Thespecialtabulationprovideddatafortheonehundredlargestagricul-
tural marketing cooperatives, based on a master list of all agricultural
cooperatives provided by Agricultural Cooperative Service ofthe U.S.
DepartmentofAgriculture to the Census, whichselectedthe top onehun-
dred by theirvalue-of-shipments or sales in SICs 20; 21; 514 (less 5141)
WholesaleTrade, Groceries and Related Products; and SIC 515Wholesale
Trade, Farm Product Raw Materials. For each food and tobacco industry
(four-digit SIC), product class (five-digit SIC), and each specially created
observation, the Census gave the vas attributable to the one hundred
cooperatives as a group. In several cases, confidentiality rules would not
allow the Census to disclose thevasvalue, but in those cases estimates
weremadebasedon: (1) whichofthemarket'sleadingeightpositionswere
heldbya cooperative(whichwasnotsubjecttodisclosurerules), (2) market
concentration (CR4, CR8, and CR20), (3) the number ofthe top one hun-
dred cooperatives, (4) the number ofplants they operated in the market
(also not a disclosure problem), and (5) the totalvas left to be allocated
tothenondisclosedobservations.Sucha proceduregaveestimatessubject
to only minimal error, and the data allowed several checks on the esti-
mates. For example, since the five-digit vas values for each four-digit
industry had to sum to the four-digitvas total, we could check our esti-
mated values doneatthe productclass level againstthe total for the four-
digit industry (see Petraglia and Rogers 1991 for details).
The 1982 Price-Cost Margin Model
An empirical structure-performance regression model was constructed
by merging the theoretical basis ofthe structure-performance models
within the industrial organizational paradigm with cooperative perfor-
mance theory. This required constructing the traditional structural vari-
ables used to explain market performance, as well as a new variable to
measure the extent of cooperative participation in a market. The basic
model is:
PCM1= 130 + 13dNLl I+ 132[AjSll + 133[CR4L + 134[MESL + 135[Kal i
+ 136[Gl i + 137[%Ca-oPL+Ei> i= 1,...,134
where:
PCM price-cost margin (percent),
NL = dichotomous geographic dispersion control variable,
AjS = advertising-to-sales ratio (percent),
CR4 = four-firm concentration ratio (percent),
MES = minimum efficient scale given by midpoint plant size (per-
cent),
Ka = capital-output ratio (percent),
G = nominal growth rate ofvas between Census year (percent),
%Ca-ap = percentage ofmarket'svas accounted for by cooperatives.
E = stochastic error term.6 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
Expected signs for the parameters are as follows:
[31, [32, [33, [34, [35, and [36 > 0
[37 < 0
With the exception ofthe lastvariable, %CO-OP, this is the model used
by Rogers (1987) in his study ofthe structure-price-cost margin relation-
ships in food and tobacco manufacturing over time from 1954 to 1977,
although he limited his sample to only national industries and hence did
not include a national-local control variable. Rogers' specification was
based on Weiss' (1974) preferred approach based on his review ofnearly
fifty structure-performancestudies.Althoughthebasicmodelhasa linear
form, empiricaltestsfornonlinearitywithregardtobothadvertisinginten-
sity (A/S) and concentration (CR4) will be done since the literature has
suggested both ofthese variables may have a nonlinear relationship with
PCM. The standard variables used in the model are discussed in Rogers
as well as in the general reviews cited previously, but a briefdiscussion
ofeach is included here alongwith a more thorough treatment ofthe new
cooperative participation variable.
Price-Cost Margin (PCM): The dependent variable used to measure
marketperformancewasthe PCM calculatedfrom Censusdataas a proxy
measureoftheLernerindex-theextenttowhichthemarketpriceexceeds
marginal cost. Theoretically, itis bounded between 0 (perfectcompetition)
and the reciprocal ofthe market's price elasticity ofdemand (monopoly).
In an oligopoly setting, under Cournot assumptions, the market's PCM,
where a weighted average marginal cost for the industry is used, equals
the market's Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index divided by the
market's price elasticity (Scherer and Ross 1990).
The Census proxy measure has the advantage ofusing the same level
ofaggregation (establishments) as the other Census variables, and hence
it avoids the problems associated with firm diversification that limit the
approachesusingfirmprofitdata.TheCensusPCMamountstothemargin
over average (not marginal) materials and labor costs as a percentage of
price. The main disadvantage ofthe Census measure is that it includes
suchthingsasadvertisingexpenses, centralofficeexpenses, anddeprecia-
tion expenses. StudiesusingtheCensus PCM approachattemptto dimin-
ish this problem by including control variables for these items. Following
Rogers (1987), we include advertising and the capital-output ratio in the
model but not other central office expenses. Weiss (1974) found central
office expenses to be an insignificant variable in his reworking ofa PCM
study, whichprovidessomejustificationforitsomission.TheCensusPCM
used in this study had sufficient variation for a cross-sectional study as
it ranged from a low of 2%, to a high of 58% with a mean value of 25%
and a standard deviation of 13.4%.
Geographic-Dispersion (NL): Since the concentration ratios reported
in the Census ofManufactures presume a national market size, they are
likely to underestimate the true concentration oflocal/regional markets.
To account for this problem we use a 0-1 variable, with 0 designating a
national market and 1 a local/regional market. Ifconcentration is posi-
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underestimated for non-national markets, then NL should be positive as
it adjusts for the bias in CR4. Although some studies have incorporated
a continuous variable that attempts to account for differentials in the
geographic sizeofmarkets, themeasureis a roughproxyandhas received
mixed results in empirical studies. We elected to use the binary variable
included in the Census special tabulation that classified twenty-four of
the 134 observations as local/regional markets.
Advertising-to-SalesRatio (A/S): Massmediaadvertising, which com-
prises approximately 50% ofall advertising expenditures reported to the
IRS, isthemaininstrumentfor creatingandmaintainingproductdifferen-
tiationinfood and tobacco products (Connoretal. 1985).Theadvertising-
to-sales ratio (AjS) is the best available measure ofthe degree ofproduct
differentiation that exists in a processed food industry. Higher margins
should be possible with greater degrees of product differentiation that
allowpricepremiumsand prevent entryfrom erodingthe highermargins.
Since advertisingexpenditures remaininthe PCM calculation, the econo-
metric test of significance must be against a null of one, rather than
the more traditional zero, to test the market power effect from product
differentiation.
ThenumeratorofAjSincludes the advertisingexpenditures insixmea-
sured media for network and spot television, network radio, newspaper
supplements, magazines, and outdoor advertisements, all of which are
directedatfinalconsumers.Thedatawerefrom LeadingNationalAdvertis-
ers, Inc. 1982,buttheexpenditureswerereassignedtotheCensusproduct
classes used in the special tabulation. The denominator was the SIC's
value-of-shipments.
Historically, cooperatives have formed in markets that coincide with
farmer-member interests. Thesemarketstypicallydo notlend themselves
tomuchproductdifferentiation. Hence, thereis likelytobesomemulticol-
linearitybetweenwhere cooperatives account for a large percentage ofan
industry'svasand the industry'sAjS ratio, butbyincludingboth in the
modelwecantestthecooperativeeffectwhilecontrollingforeffectscreated
by advertising and maintained product differentiation.
Concentration (CR4): The central interest of structure-performance
studieshas beenthe relationship betweenconcentrationand market per-
formance. All such studies included some measure of concentration or
firm market share. Although the theoretical relationship between PCM
andconcentrationgiven earlierusedtheHerfindahl-Hirschmanindex(H),
we use the four-firm concentration ratio. The CR4 has a longer history
andwasusedbyRogers (1987) andwas available for all 134observations,
whereas H was missing for seventeen observations, typically the more
concentrated markets. Empiricallythe choice between CR4 and H makes
onlyminor differences (we did use bothwith similarresults, see Petraglia
and Rogers 1991).The CR4 serves as anindicatorofpastbarriersto entry
and measures the likelihood of collusion, either tacit or direct. Margins
should be higher the greater the CR4, all else equal.
Minimum Efficient Scale (MES): MES serves as a technical barrier to
entrycreated by economies ofscale. With a U-shaped average cost curve,
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cost curve first decline and then display constant costs, the MES value is
the minimum output level consistentwith minimum average cost. Theory
suggeststhelargertheMES, thehigherthe PCMcanbewithoutattracting
entry. Despite its theoretical appeal, the empirical proxies available suffer
substantial shortcomings. The method of calculating MES in this study
relies on the midpoint-plant size approach calculated from Census data.
Although this approach has been shown to be highly correlated with eco-
nomic engineering estimates, which are superior but limited because of
their expense (Connor et al. 1985), the approach still suffers from being
limited to plant-level economies ofscale ratherthan firm level. Also it has
an upward bias whenever constant costs are found, since large firms can
expand beyond MES levels without a cost disadvantage.
Capital-Output Ratio (KO): The KO variable allows roughadjustments
for the normal return on investments required to attract capital to an
industryand for depreciation costs. Its purposeis to controlfor the differ-
ingcapitalintensitiesacrossindustries toreduce the likelihoodofa spuri-
ous relationship between CR4 and PCM. Also, high capital requirements
canbeassociatedwithbarrierstoentry,unlesscapitalmarketsareperfect.
Itwascalculatedfrom CensusdataasGrossFixedAssets/VaS, expressed
as a percent. Marginsshouldbehigherwithincreasingcapital-intensities,
all else equal.
Growth (G): The growth rate is another control variable to account for
abnormallyhigh margins thatoccurwheneverinvestments in newcapac-
ity fail to keep pace with rapidly growing demand. Such growth exerts
upward pressure on both prices and margins. The growth variable mea-
sured thevalue-of-shipments nominal growth rate between Censusyears
1977 and 1982 in percent.
Percentage CooperativeSales (%CO-OP): Thisisthe onlynewvariable
thatwas added to the standard structure-performance model and allows
an empirical test of the competitive yardstick effect of cooperatives on
market performance. Itmeasures the percent ofa market's value-of-ship-
mentsaccountedfor bytheonehundredlargestagriculturalcooperatives.
The measure follows the work ofJesse and Johnson (1980) where they
illustrated the competitiveyardstick effect by considering the open mem-
bership (OM) cooperative-to-IOFratio ofan industry. They demonstrated
that the ability to control the finished processed product's price depends
on the finished product's output, which is directly related to the control
ofthe supply ofthe processed product's input, Le., the farmer's output.
Processing cooperatives that do not control their members' output will
process larger quantities, thereby increasing the supply of the finished
product,thanwouldIOFswhenevermarketconditionsallowabove-normal
profitstobeearnedattheprocessingstage.Thisdifferencelinksthesupply
of finished product to the share held by OM cooperatives. With larger
cooperative sharesthemarketprocesses a largerquantityoffinished out-
putat a lower price. Hence, an inverse relationship between the extent of
cooperative participation and the level ofthe PCM is expected.
Centraltothetheory'sconclusionofimprovedmarketperformanceisthe
OM assumption, which prevents effective supply control (ignoring other
methods ofsupply restrictions). Ifthe cooperative has a restrictive mem-Agricultural Cooperatives and Market Performance/Rogers and Petraglia 9
bership policy, then this improved performance is unlikely to emerge and
can even be inferior to that ofan IOF processor. The nature of the data
providedonthetoponehundredagriculturalmarketingcooperativesdoes
notreveal theirmembership policies ortheiridentities. Hence, weproceed
with an assumption, supported by Youde's (1978) empirical study, that
the top one hundred cooperatives have predominately OM policies.
Since the dependent variable is the price-cost margin, we must also
assumeequal efficiencybetween IOFs and cooperative processors. Other-
wise, the inverse relationship we expectbetween %CO-OPand PCM could
be interpreted as indicating cooperatives have higher costs, not lower
prices. Wills (1985) avoided this problem by using relative prices instead
ofprice-costmargins and found cooperatives have lowerprices than IOFs
in processed food products given the samemarketconditions. Combining
thatfindingwiththerecentreviewoftheliteratureontherelativeefficiency
ofcooperativesbySextonand Iskow (1993) wheretheystate "weconclude
that there is little credible evidence to support ... that investor-owned
firms are more efficient than comparable cooperatives," we trust that the
PCM will provide a credible test ofthe original hypothesis.
For the 134 food and tobacco manufacturing markets, the %CO-OP
variable varied from zero (forty-six observations, including all tobacco
markets in SIC 21 and bakery markets in SIC 205) to a high of 64% in
butter, with a mean of8.7% and a standard deviation of 12.8%.
Results ofthe 1982 Price-Cost Margin Study
The model was first estimated by OLS with each independent variable
entered as an additive effect, but further testing showed the advertising-
to-sales ratio shouldinclude a second-orderAjS term. This suggeststhat
advertising-created product differentiation contributes positively to mar-
gins, but at a diminishing rate. The nonlinear effect from concentration
was not supported, and substituting the Herfindahl-Hirschman indexas
an alternative concentration measure gave similar results to those
reported here. (For complete results that include the actual tests see
Petraglia and Rogers 1991. The estimated coefficients had only minor
differences with none having a sign or significance level affected.) As can
be seen in table 1, advertising intensity, concentration, and growth had
the standard positive estimated coefficients, and all were statistically sig-
nificant, whereas MES and KO were positive but insignificant. These
results, except for the insignificance ofKO, were consistent with Rogers'
findings for 1977. The estimated coefficient for the new addition to the
standard structure-performance model, %CO-OP, was negative and sig-
nificant, supporting the cooperative yardstick effect.
To explore further the hypothesis that cooperatives would move an
industry's PCM towardthe competitive level, the samplewas splitinto low
(CR4 < 52.5, n = 70) and high (CR4 :2: 52.5, n = 64) concentrationgroups
based on the sample's mean CR4 value. Since PCMs are positivelyrelated
to market concentration, the negative effect from cooperatives should be
most apparent in the more concentrated industries. The results from the
two groups are also shown in table I, and the splitting ofthe data was10 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1994
Table I.-Regression Results Explaining Price-Cost Margins in Food
and Tobacco Product Classes, 1982
All Product Low Concentration
Classes n = 70
n = 134 (CR4 < 52.5)











































( ) beneath estimated coefficients are t-statistics.
(*1 coefficient significantly> 1 at the .05 significance level.
* coefficient significantly different than aat the .05 significance level.
justified by a Chow test. In both groups the adjusted R
2 was nearly the
same as in the combined estimation (.58% or .60%).
The subset of less concentrated product classes revealed MES, CR4,
and G to be statistically insignificant factors in determining PCM, while
theestimatedcoefficientfor NL, A/S, A/S2, KO, and%CO-OPweresignifi-
cant and their signs consistent with expectations. In the more concen-
tratedmarkets NL fell to insignificance, which is notsurprisinggiven only
twoobservationswereclassifiedaslocal/regionalmarkets. Concentration,
CR4, was positive and significant suggesting markets must reach some
level of concentration before a positive, linear relationship with PCM is
evident. Capital-intensity, KO, was insignificantinthe concentratedsam-
ple, unlike in the unconcentrated sample, suggesting differing capital
intensities explains PCMs in onlythe unconcentrated industries. Growth
was the othervariable thatreached significanceinthe more concentrated
markets, suggesting only the concentrated markets benefit from the
upward pressure growth exerts on margins.
The comparison between the two groups with regard to %CO-OP is of
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significant in each sample. the magnitude of the effect was nearly three
times as large in the more concentrated group. In the unconcentrated
sample. the %CO-OP estimate indicates that a 10-percentage-point
increase inthe aggregate sales share ofthe top one hundred cooperatives
would result in a decline in the PCM of 1.2 percentage points, all else
constant. More dramatically, inthemorehighlyconcentratedgroupwhere
market power opportunities should be more likely. the same increase in
the aggregate sales share by these cooperatives would result in a 3.5-
percentage-pointdeclineinthe PCM. Giventhe main hypothesiswas that
cooperativeswould move markets toward the competitive solution. this is
an important finding since one would expect greater departures from the
competitive idealas concentrationincreased, all else equal. The predicted
PCMs from holding allvariables attheirmeanvalues, except for CR4 and
%CO-OP, demonstrates this result. The predicted PCM for a concentrated
market with a CR4 of 80 without cooperatives is nearly 30%. whereas if
the percentage cooperative share is relatively high at 40% this predicted




cost margins, consistentwith the theoretical competitive yardstick effect
ofcooperatives.Withinthefoodmanufacturingsector,agriculturalcooper-
atives were associated with improved market performance. As farmers
continuetoface struggleina marketingenvironmentbecomingmore com-
plexand increasinglyconcentratedinthehandsoflarge, diversified inves-
tor-owned firms. cooperatives still seem entitled to the limited antitrust
exemptions ofthe Capper-Volstead Act. Indeed. within food and tobacco
processing markets. any abuses of market power are more likely from
large. investor-ownedfirms ratherthanthe agricultural cooperativesthat
have vertically entered food processing. Possible abuses ofmarket power
by cooperatives in other sectors of the food system were not examined
in this paper. thus our conclusions do not apply to all markets where
cooperatives operate.
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